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ABSTRACT.  With the rapid increase in the number of LAN connections to the 
world's largest computer network (the Internet), new security techniques should be 
used to protect local networks against intrusion from the Internet. Basically, we 
need to prevent destruction of data by intruders, maintain the privacy of local 
information, and prevent unauthorized use of computing resources. To improve 
network security, network connections to the Internet, in general, do not take place 
transparently. Instead, firewall servers are used to protect the systems connected to 
the local network against assaults from the Internet. But, there is a price to pay, 
usually, because the firewall server results in a bottleneck for assaults from the 
Internet into the LAN as well as for allowed communication between the LAN and 
the Internet. In this paper, we will discuss how network security can be achieved via 
security and firewall design policies to satisfy deferent security requirements in 
order to protect computer networks against intrusion as they get connected to the 
Internet. We will also present some recommendations for achieving the security of 
networks using firewalls. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Local users in a campus or a company may require the expertise of other users in the field, 
who are often able to spot new business trends and other up to date information faster than 
local users. Also, remote users may need to make decisions based on the same data that is 
available for those at the headquarter. Remote access network technologies provide remote 
users with reliable access to their private network. For this purpose, wide area network 
(WAN) digital-service technologies are increasingly used. The choice of technologies 
depends on individual corporate needs, Some companies need full-time point-to-point 
connections for their branch offices, where others need connections for telecommunications 
or mobile employees. 
The nature of computer networks indicates that they are designed to allow the free flow of 
information. The chief benefit of networks is that they enable users to share information 
easily. But easy access to information is also the cause of concern for those in charge of 
keeping a network free from security threats. With modern network technologies, a user can 
sit at a workstation in one location and have a process connected to a system in another 
location with files mounted from a system in a third location. Therefore users are able to do 
their work just as if all of the systems are in the same site as the computer they are logged-on 
to. All of this is possible, because of the free flow of data which is necessary to the basic 
functionality of the network. However on the other hand, the free flow of information is 
contrary to achieving network security. The overall usability of the network should not be 
greatly affected by security measures used to keep private information and sensitive data 
insulated from unauthorized access. The demand for security products to guard private 
networks from intrusion is on the rise as the number of businesses and government agencies 
connecting to the Internet continues to increase. 
In modern network environments, the transmission control protocol / Internet 
protocol.(TCP/IP) suite is widely used to interconnect computing facilities. Unfortunately, 
several security vulnerabilities exist in the TCP specification in addition to other weaknesses 
in some of its implementations. Therefore, and because of these vulnerabilities, an intruder 
might be able to attack TCP-based systems to gain a TCP connection or cause denial of 
service to other legitimate users [first]. According to an Information Week/Ernst and Young 
Security Survey, one of every five respondents admitted that, in twelve months time, their 
corporate networks, had been broken into, or had been tried to be broken into, by intruders via 
the Internet [second]. 
To achieve the goal of securing networks without restricting the flow of information, Internet 
firewalls are used as points of security guarding private networks from intrusion. Internet 
firewalls main purpose is to control and audit access to services and provide defense, both 
from inside and outside a private network. Therefore, a mechanism for selectively permitting 
or blocking traffic between the Internet and the network being protected is required. For 
instance traffic can be controlled by [third]: 
1. Routers at an IP level, by selectively permitting or denying traffic based on
source/destination address or port. In this case, at least a degree of direct IP-level traffic 
between the Internet and the protected network must be permitted. 
2. Hosts at an application level to force traffic to move out of the protocol layer for more
detailed examination Application level firewalls unlike routers, do not have the 
requirement of direct IP-level traffic, but are less flexible since they require development 
of specialized application forwarders known as “proxies”. 
There are three types of computer network securities: 1) Internet security, where computers 
are connected through a firewall, 2) Inter-Company security, where the connection is made 
through a tunnel, and 3) Intranet security, where computers are connect through multiple 
firewalls [fourth]. Regardless of the network type under consideration, using a firewall does 
not reduce the need for highly skilled system administration and it should not be an excuse to 
pay less attention to system administration of the site. But on the contrary, when a firewall is 
compromised, a poorly administered site would be widely-open to intruders and therefore, 
damage. Firewalls provides barriers, therefore, more time can be spent on site system 
administration duties and less time responding to incidents and damages. Also, a 
communications pathway should exist between system administrators and firewall/site 
security administrators to alert the site about new security problems, and other security-
related information [second]. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses alternative security solutions. Section 
3 discusses a number of important considerations to the design of security solutions for 
enterprise networks. Section 4 talks about security and firewall policies. Section 5 looks at 
firewalls as an approach to security that helps in the implementation of a larger security 
policy. Section 6 presents some useful recommendations when considering firewall solutions. 
And finally, a conclusion is given in Section 7. 
2. PROTECTION METHODS 
Security protection methods are basically concerned with ensuring network's efficiency and 
effectiveness. With successful security implementations, risks can be reduced but not 
eliminated. There are several protection methods to ensure confidentiality, integrity and 
continuity. The dominating security protection method in the mainframe computing 
environment is the Access Control. It consists primarily of functions related to: 
1. Access Mediation via connection control establishment, 
2. Identification by means of Logon-Ids, 
3. Authentication by means of Passwords, 
4. Deferent levels of authorization controlled by Access Privileges, 
5. Monitoring and enforcement, 
6. Disaster recovery programs to respond to incidents, 
7. Logging to record traffic and usage of services. 
In an open-networked environment such as the Internet, these functions must be integrated in 
order to achieve successful security controls. Integrated security should include [fourth, fifth]: 
1. Physical security, 
2. Computer based security, 
3. Encryption and Authentication, 
4. Procedures, and Awareness. 
2.1 Password Authentication 
The most common security technique within computer systems is the validation or 
authentication of passwords which is used to validate users. The user should be the only one 
to know his password, while guessing it randomly should be costly. Additional passwords 
may be required by the different Internet services. This protection technique will only work as 
a useful identification method, if passwords are protected and applied correctly. For better 
protection of a personal password, the following prevention points may be used: 
1. The minimum length of a password should not be less than six (eight is better)
alphanumeric characters, 
2. Care and creativeness should be used when constructing a password, 
3. Passwords should not be exposed or shared with any one, 
4. Passwords should be changed frequently and regularly. 
2.2 Encryption 
Encryption is one of the protection mechanism for data confidentiality and integrity. It also, 
via secret handshaking, can ensure the correctness of communication between any two 
computers. It makes key resources unavailable to attackers, therefore, when properly 
implemented, it can prevent attacks against networks and protect against information 
disclosure. Encryption is becoming the standard policy in any communication of sensitive 
information. It has many applications including: the protection of file servers, hard disks, 
faxes, telephone conversations via other types of communication. But, it is particularly 
important for communications with remote sites. Many applications have their own 
encryption schemes which may be transparent to users, as long as they operate with the same 
applications at both ends of the transmission within restricted environments. 
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) is often used for mail transmissions because of its simplicity and 
wide availability. Digital Signatures can also be created using encryption algorithms in order 
to verify the identities of the senders of the messages as well as their recipients. Public keys 
can also be obtained through the Internet. 
On the Internet, a message will be stored on several, may be thousands, of servers before it 
reaches its final destination. Therefore, messages on any one of those servers can be looked at 
or modified but it is difficult to do so because a message is broken into parts. This practice 
can be made almost impossible with encryption. 
2.3 Protection With Firewalls 
The best line of defense is an up-to-date and constantly maintained firewall. A firewall/proxy 
server is a mechanism that is used to protect a trusted network, such as an organization's 
internal network, from an untrusted network, typically the Internet, or any other untrusted 
network [second]. Firewall/Proxy servers provide the most reliable method to control 
outbound access and to protect networks against unauthorized intrusions. It checks addresses 
and characteristics of messages to make sure that they follow authorization rules. All 
messages that are verified to be legitimate are allowed to flow through the firewall, while 
others are blocked. The majority of firewalls are used between internal networks and the 
Internet, but they can be used in any internet, such as a company's wide area network 
[second]. The design decision sets the general attitude of the firewall whether to provide a 
higher degree of service or a higher degree of security. To protect the firewall server itself, no 
users should be allowed to login on the firewall server [sixth]. 
2.4 Firewall Concepts 
A firewall is a trusted system that is placed between a trusted internal network and another 
untrusted external network. The firewall system implements a policy that defines what 
information should be allowed to pass through. In general firewalls have the following 
features and limitations [fourth]: 
Features: 
1. It can control the access to the protected network. 
2. It can provide one central point of security. 
3. It provides more privacy by hiding addresses. 
4. It provides logging for security and other purposes. 
5. It can notify the network administrator of security related events, so that he can take the
appropriate actions. 
6. It can be integrated with authentication keys. 
7. It enforces the security policy. 
 
Limitations: 
1. Restricted access to desirable services. 
2. Back door access problem. 
3. Inside attacks. 
4. Email viruses. 
5. Potential bottleneck 
6. Single point of failure. 
2.5 Other Aspects 
The aspect of restricting access is not the only one that matters to computer network security. 
Other aspects include the situation where firewalls may become annoying by requiring end-
users to learn special functions in order to walk through the firewall, in which case, end-users 
may start looking for ways to go around them. 
Another aspect is the inclusion of “secured” kernels. A secured kernel is defined as a 
modified version of an operating system so that it contains only the necessary services that are 
needed to run the firewall. This approach forbids attackers from exploiting other services, 
simply because they don't exist. The majority of firewall products come with secured kernels 
based on UNIX variants, while some other product's secured kernels are based on DOS. 
There has been trade-offs between UNIX and DOS based products. The lack of integrated 
networking capabilities in DOS can be seen as an advantage, because it means that the 
firewall can't be crossed over when the firewall application is compromised. However, DOS 
based products have shown a slower performance, which is considered to be one of the very 
important security issues for the following reasons [fifth]: 
• Frustrated end-users may look for ways around the bottleneck. That is caused by the slow
response time of the firewall 
• Any path that circumvents the firewall can present a point of entry to intruders. 
• When invaders overwhelm a firewall with requests more than it can handle, access to
protected resources may be cut off. This is called denial-of-service attack, which is one of 
the most common forms of attacks on the Internet. The weaker a firewall's performance, 
the more sensitive it is to a denial-of-service attack. 
3. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
In this section, we will discuss a selection of a number of design considerations that often 
come into play when designing security solutions for enterprise networks. 
3.1 Layering 
Security mechanisms can be implemented at different layers in the protocol stack allowing 
different levels of flexibility and transparency. Generally speaking, lower layers 
implementations are more transparent to applications. On the other hand, implementations at 
higher layers provide more flexibility of customization to the requirements of individual 
applications. Applications often implement security controls into their own specific protocols, 
for the following two reasons [seventh]: 
1. Existing protocols have a very limited security, 
2. In several cases, the decision is made to build security into an application in order to make
it portable to environments running different sets of underlying protocols. 
This approach may lead to multiple security mechanisms that may provide the same service, 
such as the authentication of data-origin, while not interacting with each other. Therefore, as 
much as practical, secure application-layer communication protocols should be used to 
support a wide range of applications. 
3.2 Centralization Versus Distribution 
Usually, in an enterprise networking environments, users and resources tend to reside in more 
distributed locations. Often, it is desirable to centralize operations to some extent to reduce 
the overhead but more importantly, security risks that could be caused by the reliance on 
management by multiple inexperienced system administrators. But, this does not necessarily 
mean that security information has to be stored centrally, for example, it is often 
advantageous to keep access control lists (ACLs) with their related resources, while still be 
managed centrally. Doing so, it will be possible to improve the performance of access control 
checks as well as allowing the ACLs to be moved with the related resources from one system 
to another [seventh]. 
A large enterprise network may be subdivided into a number of management domains, in 
which authorized users in a given source domain may utilize resources in another target 
domain. Therefore, it is necessary to set up inter-domain relationships, so that both domains 
can be used to obtain the required information for user authentication. 
3.3 Integration 
In an enterprise network, many of the interconnected heterogeneous computer systems may 
have their own local user authentication and access control facilities. The usability and 
manageability of enterprise networks are greatly improved, when integrating local system 
security facilities for the whole network. Some of the problems that may arise in network 
environments that have distributed security facilities include the following [seventh]: 
• Because each system recognizes its own set of local users and assigns them unique IDs,
passwords, and other security-relevant attributes, a user has to remember multiple ID-
password pairs. Therefore, users may start writing passwords down, and subsequently, 
these written passwords may fall in the hands of some who might endanger the security of 
the system. 
• Because resources access is governed by local access control facilities which depends on
local user IDs and security attributes, users must have local IDs defined on each system, so 
that they can access resources on different systems. 
4. SECURITY AND FIREWALL POLICIES 
As mentioned earlier, firewalls provide the best protection mechanism for network security 
against intrusion and unauthorized practices. However, firewalls can be implemented in a 
number of ways, in order for the different security requirements and policies to be 
accommodated via the various firewall architectures. In addition, special consideration is 
given to the special cases that exist in network designs. In this section, we will discuss 
security and policies. Security is needed to: 1) prevent destruction of data by an intruder, 2) 
maintain the privacy of local information, 3) prevent unauthorized use of computing resources 
[eighth] 
The highest level of security policies is the overall organizational policy. It highlights the 
most important and critical issues to the functionality of the organization. On the next level of 
security, where the firewall's network service-access policy is formulated, the following 
policies are addressed: 1) site-specific policies concerning physical access to properties, 2) 
the general access policy to information systems, 3) policies related to the specific access of 
services on the information systems. 
Designing, installing, and using a firewall system to achieve network security is directly 
influenced by two levels of network policy: 1) network service access policy and 2) firewall 
design policy [second] 
• Network service access policy is a higher-level, issue specific policy that define what
services will be allowed or explicitly denied from the protected network, how they are 
used, and exceptions to this policy. 
• firewall design policy is a lower-level policy that describes the actual ways for restricting
the access and filtering the services by the firewall as defined in the network service access 
policy. 
The security policy should clearly reflect the importance of strong firewall administration. 
This is because a firewall is only as effective as its administration which in fact is a critical 
job and should be given as much time as possible. Therefore, if the firewall is not 
administered appropriately, it is most likely to become insecure, and allow break-ins, but at 
the same time, it is giving an illusion that the site is still secure. Security policies can be 
addressed at three main levels: organization, access of network services, and firewall design. 
4.1 Organizational Level 
In an organization, the highest level at which security requirements should be considered is 
the organization itself. This involves defining the overall organizational security policy for 
the type of organization's type of security environment. Also, when considering solutions to 
implement such security policy, special consideration should be given to the balance between 
security and functional requirements. 
4.1.1 Organizational policy:   At the highest level, the overall organizational policy might 
look like the following [second]: 
• Information is critical to the economical growth of the organization. 
• In order to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, availability and utility of
information, all cost-effective efforts shall be made. 
• It is the priority for all employees at all levels of the company to protect the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information resources. 
The design of network and firewall security policies is greatly affected by the type of security 
environment for which it is designed. 
4.1.2 Security environments:   In this discussion, we will focus on the corporate and 
academic security environments. Corporate and academic institutions face different concerns 
related to the security of their information and computing resources. 
In most corporate security environments, firewalls are used to block or heavily restrict access 
from untrusted hosts to internal data and computing resources as well as to limit access from 
the inside to untrusted hosts outside the corporate. the following is typical in the corporate 
security environment [eighth]: 
• A corporate firewall is defined as a strong security perimeter around collaborating
employees within the corporation, as shown in Figure 1. 
• The network security perimeter surrounds the corporate network and exclude everything
else, except in some cases, where it might include machines at employee homes. 
• The security perimeter cautiously controls the transfer of information and in sometimes it
actually forbids all outward information flow. 
• Although, more open access to the Internet might be desired by many corporations, often,
they choose to limit Internet access to achieve corporate security by sacrificing services 
such as personal World-Wide-Web pages. 
• In recent firewall designs some of these limitations are relaxed, but only to support specific
interactions between sites that are located within a single private network or authentication 
domain.  
On the other hand, for academic research groups, the trade-off between safety and 
collaboration is unacceptable. Consequently, the traditional corporate firewall is not suitable 
for academic environments, as pointed out below[eighth]: 
• The natural place to draw a security perimeter in a corporate environment is around the
whole corporation. However. this can not be the case with academic environments, as 
shown in Figure 1, where it seems nearly impossible to draw a perimeter surrounding 
everything a trusted user might need to interact closely-with, while keeping other untrusted 
users out. 
 
Trusted Untrusted Close
Corporate
Too small firewall
excludes some trusted
Academic Environments
Too big firewall
includes some
Figure 1: Nature of trusted users, untrusted users, and collaboration
   in corporate and academic environment 
• If a corporate firewall is placed around a research group, it would exclude collaborators
located in other sites. Therefore, If the firewall is chosen to be: 
◊ too big. it will definitely include untrusted people, especially that universities offer
almost no physical security. This is indicated by the dashed box of Figure1. 
◊ too small, then it will exclude some of the people with whom we need to share data
as indicated by the dotted box of Figure 1. 
Corporations can tolerate limitations of the Internet connectivity in order to keep their sites 
secure, however, research organizations cannot perform under such limitations, for the 
following reasons[eighth]: 
1. Researchers and trusted users need unrestricted access to Internet resources located outside
the firewall. 
2. Researchers and trusted users need an unrestricted ability to publish and distribute
information to the world outside the firewall, which is critical to the research community. 
3. Research collaborators and trusted users located outside the firewall should be allowed to
access protected resources. 
In addition, there is a number of other factors that may apply when comparing the two 
security environments, as shown in Table 1. These factors include the usual considerations of 
cost, ease-of-management, performance, and reliability in a heterogeneous computing 
environment. Usually, academic institutions can not allocate enough money to obtain the right 
computer security hardware, software, or personnel. Therefore, leading to the lack of 
dedicated security staff which in turn could mean for instance, that a firewall might be 
managed by inexperienced people such as new graduate students with limited expertise. 
Table 1: Comparison of corporate and academic security environments 
  
Factors Corporate Academic
Firewall security 
perimeter
A corporate firewall is defined 
as a strong security perimeter 
around collaborating 
employees within the 
corporation that excludes 
everything else, except in 
some cases, where it might 
include machines at employee 
homes.
An academic firewall seems 
nearly impossible to draw a 
security perimeter surrounding 
everything a trusted user might 
need to interact closely-with, 
while keeping other untrusted 
users out.
Security perimeter 
controls
Cautiously controls the 
transfer of information and in 
sometimes it actually forbids 
all outward information flow.
Supports free exchange of 
information.
Limitations of 
Internet access
Corporations can tolerate 
limitations of the Internet 
connectivity in order to keep 
their sites secure. These 
limitations can be relaxed, but 
only to support specific 
interactions between sites that 
are located within a single 
private network or 
authentication domain.
Research organizations require 
unlimited Internet connectivity 
in order to support 
collaboration between internal 
and external research groups.
Financial allocations Usually, adequate financial 
allocations can be made 
available to obtain the right 
computer security hardware, 
software, or personnel.
Usually, academic institutions 
can not allocate enough money 
to obtain the right computer 
security hardware, software, or 
personnel.
Expertise Dedicated security staff. Lack of dedicated security staff 
which results in relying on 
inexperienced people such as 
new graduate students with 
limited expertise.
 
4.1.3 Security versus functional requirements:   Firewalls should include certain security 
measures to protect private networks when connected to the Internet. These measures should 
include an integrated rights check that permits access control to the Internet based on the: user 
name, calling client workstation, and requested service. In general, network secure connection 
to the Internet requirements should include the following [sixth]: 
Authentication methods of different strengths:  Different authentication methods should be 
supported by the firewall system. These methods may range from “TCP reserved port 
authentication” to the deployment of chip cards, depending on the area of usage. 
1. Access control on the basis of service, host, and user:  Not all users in the LAN should
be granted access to all services of the Internet. Rather, only certain users should be 
enabled to use distinguished services. 
2. Restriction of services: Blocking parts of the services, should be possible as well as
preventing the usage of certain destination addresses. 
3. Logging for error diagnosis and accounting: All error situations, potential assaults,
destinations of connection establishments, and the size of the data transferred, should be 
logged by the firewall system. 
4. Protection of the firewall server against the Internet service access system: It should
be impossible for a user of the Internet service access system such as firewalls or proxies 
to threaten the security of the host on which the server is running. 
Usually security requirements and functional requirements are contradicting objectives. 
Nevertheless, when using firewalls to achieve network security, firewalls should satisfy the 
following functional requirements: 
1. Support of as many communication protocols as possible: Since, it may be difficult to
cover many different protocol families such as DECnet., AppleTalk, and TCP/IP, at least 
one protocol family with as many sub-protocols as possible should be supported. 
2. Minimal modification effort: In order to implement an Internet service access system,
network programs generally have to be modified. however, such modification effort should 
be kept as low as possible. 
3. Low resource utilization on the firewall server: Resource requirements, such as main
memory, disk space, and CPU time, that is needed to run the firewall system components 
on the firewall server should be as minimum as possible. 
4.2 Network Services Access Policy 
Network service-access policy should be an integral part of a strong site-security policy and 
an overall policy1 for the protection of information resources. In network service access 
policy, the attention is directed toward the restriction and use of internetwork services. But 
while doing so, it is very important that the network service access policy also includes all 
other means of network access such as dial-in and serial line Internet protocol / point to point 
protocol (SLIP/PPP) connections. When restrictions is implemented on one network service 
access, users may be motivated to try other ways. For example, if web browsing is prevented 
through a restricted gateway access to the Internet, users may try to obtain this service by 
creating dial-up PPP connections which are, normally, authorized as an ad hoc connections. 
These ad hoc connections are likely to have an unacceptable security effects resulting in 
opening the network to attacks. 
The network service-access policy should be realistic and reliable, as well as designed before 
the actual implementation of the firewall. As realistic policy, it should maintain a balance 
                                                           
1This should include everything such as document shredding, virus scanning, remote access, 
and floppy disk tracking. 
between protecting the network from known risks and providing users with reasonable access 
to network resources. 
Adherence to the network service-access policy prevents ad hoc circumvention or 
modification of the firewall's access controls. The typical network service-access policies that 
a firewall should implement are [second]: 
• Allowing access from the internal site to the Internet, and disallowing access to the site
from the Internet 
• Allowing limited access from the Internet to selected systems such as e-mail and
information servers. 
Normally, firewalls implement the policies of network service-access that allow some access 
from the Internet to selected internal servers. But this access is accepted only when necessary 
and combined with strong authentication. 
4.3 Firewall Design Policy 
The focus on firewalls has been concentrated mainly on the layout of various possible 
configurations of routers, host systems, interfaces and sub-nets. But it is essential to think of a 
firewall as a part of an overall security policy. While the security policy defines the services 
and access to be permitted, a firewall is an approach to security by helping in the 
implementation of a larger security policy [ninth]. In its general definition, a firewall is a 
system or group of systems that enforces access control policies between two networks. 
While, more precisely, it is a system or a collection of components placed between two 
networks to protect the trusted network from the untrusted network by maintaining the 
following three properties [second]: 
1. All traffic going out from the inside and all traffic coming in from the outside, must pass
through the firewall. 
2. Only authorized traffic, as defined by the local security policy, is allowed to pass through
the firewall. 
3. The firewall system itself is immune to penetration. 
Many of the commercially-available firewall products are very powerful and by deploying a 
firewall, most of the security problems that are associated with internetworking can be fixed. 
For organizations having, or planning to create a connection between their network and 
another network, firewalls are considered as the best defense line. However, firewalls, at least 
in the narrow sense of the term, do not provide complete solution [second]. A firewall should 
constitute of both the policy and the implementation of that policy in terms of [ninth]: 
1. Network configuration, 
2. Hosts systems and routers, 
3. Other advanced security measures such as authentication instead of static passwords. 
The firewall design policy defines the rules used in implementing the policy of the network 
service access. The designer of firewall design policy must be fully aware of the threats and 
vulnerabilities related to TCP/IP, and the capabilities and limitations of firewalls in general. It 
is extremely important to consider a security design policy before implementing the firewall. 
Normally, firewalls implement one of two basic security design policies: 1) permit all 
services unless otherwise are expressly denied, 2) deny all services unless otherwise are 
expressly permitted. Services which should not be passed through the firewall can be placed, 
separate from other site systems, on screened subnets. Depending on security requirements, 
some firewall types are more appropriate than others. A firewall that implements the first 
policy would have the following features [second]: 
1. By default, allows all services to pass into the site, except services that are identified as
prohibited by the service-access policy. 
2. Offer more ways for getting around the firewall which is not desirable most of the time. An
example of this is that users would be able to access new services that are not addressed or 
not yet denied by the policy. Also, denied services could be run by users at non-standard 
TCP or UDP (User Datagram Protocol) ports that are not specifically denied by the policy. 
3. Better accommodate services that are difficult to filter, such as X Windows, FTP, Archie,
and RPC (Remote Procedure Call) [ninth, tenth] 
On the other hand, the second policy is stronger, safer, and follows the standard access model 
that is used in all areas of information security. Therefore a firewall that implements this 
policy has the following features [second]: 
1. Deny all services by default except those that have been identified as allowed, 
2. More difficult to implement, 
3. More restrictive for users; 
4. Services such as X Windows, FTP, Archie, and RPC may have to be blocked or heavily
reduced. 
In order to design a firewall policy and implement that policy, the policy designer should start 
with the most secure firewall design policy, which denies all services except those that are 
explicitly permitted. Then he should understand and try to answer the following questions 
[second]: 
1. What Internet services will the organization be using and what risks are associated with
providing these services and access? 
2. Are there any additional requirements, such as encryption or dial-in support? 
3. Will the services be used on a local basis, across the Internet, dial-in from home, or from
remote organizations? 
4. What is the cost of providing protection, in terms of controls and network usability? 
5. If a particular service is too risky or too expensive to secure, how would the decision be
made regarding security versus usability? 
5. FIREWALL SPECIFICATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS 
The next step after deciding to use firewalls protection method to implement the security 
policy, is the acquisition of a cost-effective firewall that renders a suitable level of protection. 
What firewall is right for a given customer?. The answer to this question, is that there is no 
single firewall solution for all customers. This is because security needs are diverse such as: 
the level of needed customization, the available level of experience with UNIX, whether 
integrated Internet services are required or not, and the size and complexity of the network 
[fourth]. The exact features of a firewall to provide effective implementation for a specific 
security policy can not be stated here, but a firewall in general should [second]: 
• Support advanced authentication procedures, or at least, it should be integrable with other
advanced authentication procedures. 
• Control service access to specified host systems as needed by means of filtering
techniques. 
• Support the use of a flexible and user friendly IP filtering language that is capable of
filtering on as many attributes as possible. Such attributes should include IP addresses of 
both the source and the destination, the type of protocol, TCP/UDP ports for the source 
and destination, as well as inbound and outbound interface. 
• Use of proxies for services such as the FTP and TELNET, X and gopher, in order to use
centralized advanced authentication measures at the firewall. 
• Support centralized handling of site e-mail in order to reduce direct SMTP connections
between the site and remote systems. 
• Distinguish between the protected public information servers and other site systems that
are not allowed for public access. 
• Have the capability to centralize and filter dial-in access. 
• Contain logging mechanisms of traffic and doubtful activities, as well as mechanisms for
the reduction of log records in order to make them readable and understandable. 
• Ensure firewall host integrity by implementing a secured version of the operating system
as a part of the firewall, if it is required to have an operating system such as UNIX. The 
operating system should have all patches installed with other security tools as necessary. 
• Be simple in design so that it can be understood, maintained, and verified for its strength
and correctness. 
In addition, the firewall as well as any related operating system should be, in a timely manner, 
updated with patches and other bug fixes. Especially that the Internet is changing continually, 
new vulnerabilities will always arise. Therefore, it is important the firewall be flexible in 
order to adapt to changing needs, as well as staying current on new threats and vulnerabilities. 
Otherwise, new services and enhancements to existing services may represent possible 
difficulties for any firewall installation. 
The decision whether to buy or build a firewall, involves some advantages and disadvantages 
as shown in Table 2. For organizations that have the capability to develop a firewall from 
scratch or put it together from available equipment and software components, it will be to 
their advantage to build their own firewall. On the other hand, for other organizations, a wide 
range of firewall service technologies are offered by several vendors. These include: the 
necessary hardware and software, the development of security policy, security reviews and 
risk assessments, as well as security training. Whether the decision is made to buy or build a 
firewall, security policy has to be developed first. 
Table 2: Tradeoffs between  In-house and vendor-supplied firewall 
 
Comparison In-House Vendor-Supplied 
Factors Firewall Firewall
Resources The organization should 
consider  whether it has the 
internal resources to build 
and maintain the firewall.
The vendor is responsible for 
the necessary resources to 
build and maintain the firewall.
Experience Enables personnel to 
understand the specifics of 
the design and use of the 
firewall.
In-house personnel are not 
given the opportunity to 
understand the specifics of the 
design and use of the firewall.
Overall cost of  the 
firewall should 
consider: 
(This is in addition 
to the cost of 
equipment)
The time required: 
1. To build and document
the firewall. 
2. To maintain the firewall 
3. To add new features as
needed. 
1. Free installation. 
 Free maintenance services if
provided by the vendor. 
3. The extra charges when
adding new custom 
features. 
Maintenance Organization’s 
responsibility
Usually, Vendor’s 
responsibility
New features Can be custom tailored. Usually, are general purpose.
 
One very important factor to consider when computing the cost of a firewall, is the cost of its 
administration. In addition to the initial required resources during the building phase of the 
firewall, an organization should decide whether or not it has the resources for operating and 
maintaining a successful firewall. To help in making this decision, the organization should 
consider the necessary resources to handle issues such as: firewall verification for correctness 
and expected performance, maintenance, enhancements, updates, backups, and training 
[second]: 
6. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommendations presented in this section fall into two groups. These recommendations 
should help organization in achieving their network security using firewalls. The first group 
of recommendations is aimed toward preparing the network environment for the use of 
firewall protection. On the other hand, the second group of recommendations is aimed toward 
the selection or design of a firewall. These recommendations are as follows: 
 
• Recommendations for preparing the network environment: 
1. Standardization: Operating system and other software should be standardized in order
to make installations of new programs and other security related fixes more 
manageable. 
2. Procedures: A procedure should be established to achieve efficient, site-wide
installation of programs and new software. 
3. Proper tools: The use of proper utility programs and services that will assist in
achieving centralized system administration, should be consider if centralized system 
administration will result in a better security and administration. 
4. Preventive security checks: Host systems should be periodically scanned and checked
for common vulnerabilities and configuration errors. 
• Recommendations for designing and selecting firewalls: 
In addition to the general features of firewalls which we have discussed in section 5, a 
firewall should consider the following issues: 
1. Policy support: The firewall should support: 
a( The security policy as defined by the organization. 
b( The security policy that denies all services except those specifically permitted.
The firewall should adhere to this policy even if it is not the one in use by the 
organization. 
2. Future support: The firewall should be able to accommodate and support of new
services and requirements, as the security policy of the organization changes. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The Internet is a rapidly changing and expanding environment that is constantly facing new 
challenges which should be resolved to assist user concerns and demands related to security 
and user protection. There are several problems that are related to the use and implementation 
of the Internet. These include among others, IP address domains, traffic overflows, and 
bottlenecks between users and service providers. But, the biggest concern is the absence of 
necessary security controls. In addition, expected new technologies on the Internet will 
require new creative security solutions, because what has worked in the past, may not 
necessarily work in the future. 
Firewalls are considered as the best protection method against the threats that are facing 
computer networks. But, the concentration on firewalls has been mainly on the numerous 
possible configuration layouts of routers, host systems, interfaces and sub-nets. However, it is 
very important to treat firewalls as a part of an overall security policy, where firewalls are 
used to implement the security policy which define the services and access to be permitted. 
Even when firewalls are used, a highly skilled system administration of the site is still needed. 
This is because, firewalls provides barriers, but when a barrier is compromised, a poorly 
administered site would be widely-open for intrusion. 
In this paper, we have discussed how network security is achieved through security and 
firewall design policies to satisfy deferent security requirements. We have also presented 
some recommendations for achieving the security of networks using firewalls. 
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